The sustainability of reform has always been a major concern in Bangladesh. Time and again, we have witnessed strong initiatives aimed at addressing long-standing irregularities and corruption in various sectors, only to see those efforts weakened later by political realities or pressure from influential interest groups. Recent developments in the banking sector have revived those familiar concerns. The banking reforms initiated during the tenure of the interim government had begun to restore a degree of confidence in the country’s financial system. However, the Bank Resolution Act 2026 has taken the reform process in a direction that has generated considerable controversy and raised serious questions about the future of banking sector reform.Under the new law, former owners of scandal-ridden banks are now being given an opportunity to regain ownership. The government and Bangladesh Bank were compelled to inject thousands of crores of taka into these institutions to prevent their collapse. Various rescue measures were undertaken at significant public expense. Yet, under the new legal framework, former owners may reclaim their stakes by paying only 7.5 percent of the required amount upfront, while receiving additional time to settle the remainder. According to many economists, this appears less like accountability and more like an unexpected reward.The crisis facing these banks was not the result of unfortunate circumstances. Five of the affected banks had long been controlled by a Chattogram-based business conglomerate accused of treating depositors’ funds as a private financial resource. Several other banks were similarly managed under questionable practices for years. Allegations involving related-party lending, regulatory circumvention, anonymous loans, and large-scale embezzlement are well documented. These practices gradually rendered the banks financially dysfunctional, eventually forcing state intervention. Even today, countless depositors continue to wait for the return of their hard-earned savings.Against this backdrop, an ordinance issued in May 2025 sought to permanently remove the responsible owners from bank management. Through board restructuring, consolidation, and recapitalization efforts, the government sent a clear signal that the culture of bank looting would no longer be tolerated. After years of crisis, public confidence had begun to recover. However, many economists and financial experts believe that the new law passed by Parliament has significantly weakened that message. Some fear that if former owners are allowed to return, future crises of a similar nature may become even more difficult to address.At the heart of this debate lies a fundamental question: Does Bangladesh genuinely seek to establish accountability in its banking sector, or does it intend to keep the door open for powerful actors to return despite serious misconduct? Economist Zahid Hussain has argued that such provisions reinforce a culture of impunity. They send a troubling signal to the financial sector that even major abuses and mismanagement may ultimately be negotiable. At the same time, they convey a discouraging message to depositors, suggesting that the state’s commitments may not be as enduring as promised.According to Professor Birupaksha Paul, the law represents a “harmful compromise” that could further weaken the moral foundations of the banking sector. The issue extends far beyond the future of a handful of banks; it concerns the message being delivered to the entire financial system. If individuals accused of contributing to a bank’s collapse are ultimately permitted to regain control of that institution, what incentive remains for responsible behavior? The institutionalization of such moral hazard would inevitably undermine the long-term stability of the banking sector.The government’s position is that the law contains sufficient safeguards. Requirements relating to fresh capital injections, settlement of creditor claims, Bangladesh Bank scrutiny, and designated monitoring periods have all been incorporated. However, the reality is that these safeguards depend on the effectiveness of the very regulatory framework whose failures contributed to the crisis in the first place. Bangladesh’s banking history offers relatively few examples of regulators taking firm action against influential business groups. Consequently, despite appearing robust on paper, serious doubts remain regarding how effective these safeguards will be in practice.A broader political reality cannot be ignored either. Bangladesh has witnessed numerous laws and policies whose stated objective was to protect the public interest but which ultimately served the interests of privileged groups. Similar concerns are now being raised about the Bank Resolution Act. Critics question whether the current government is yielding to pressure from powerful business interests. Some even wonder whether a new version of the oligarchic politics that has long been criticized is once again emerging.Bangladesh is not the first country where banking reform has encountered political resistance. Economic power and political influence are often deeply intertwined. Yet the true meaning of reform lies in a government’s willingness to prioritize long-term institutional interests over short-term political convenience or pressure. If the interests of former owners are given greater weight than those of the taxpayers whose money was used to rescue these institutions and the depositors who continue to bear the consequences, then the credibility of the reform agenda will inevitably suffer.The government insists that it is cleaning up the mess of the past. Critics of the new law, however, see a different reality. If reform ultimately results in the rehabilitation of the very actors whose actions helped create the crisis, then it is not a process of cleaning up the mess; it is merely repackaging and recycling it. And that is precisely why the Bank Resolution Act 2026 has become a source of growing concern.Md. Mukhlesur RahmanIslamic Economist, Legal Researcher, Social Thinker, and Human Rights Activist.